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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
vs.
Case No. 20584
Category No. 2

GERALD W. DEITMAN and
ALBERT D. LOZANO,
Defendants/Appellants.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a petition for rehearing of a decision filed by the
Court on May 28, 1987. Originally this case was appealed from
convictions imposed for Burglary, a third degree felony, and Theft,
a second degree felony, in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt
Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, Judge,
presiding.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The facts are set forth in the Brief of Appellant at pp.
2-4.
INTRODUCTION
This petition for rehearing is filed pursuant to Rule 35,
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

In Brown v. Pickard, denying

rehfg, 11 P. 512 (Utah 1886), the Utah Supreme Court established the
standard for granting a petition for rehearing, stating:
To justify a rehearing, a strong case must be
made. We must be convinced that the court failed
to consider some material point in the case, or
that it erred in its conclusions....

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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11 P. at 512. Later, in Cummings v. Nielson# 129 P. 619 (1913) this
Court added:
To make an application for a rehearing is a
matter of right, and we have no desire to
discourage the practice of filing petitions for
rehearings in proper cases. When this court,
however, has considered and decided all of the
material questions involved in a case, a
rehearing should not be applied for, unless we
have misconstrued or overlooked some statute or
decision which may affect the result, or that we
have based the decision on some wrong principle
of law, or have either misapplied or overlooked
something which materially affects the result....
If there are some reasons, however, such as we
have indicated above, or other good reasons, a
petition for a rehearing should be promptly filed
and, if it is meritorious, its form will in no
case be scrutinized by this court.
Cummings v. Nielson, supra at 624. The argument section of this
brief will establish that, applying these standards, this petition
for rehearing is properly before the Court and should be granted.
Indeed, in its opinion of State v. Deitman, 58 Utah Adv. Rep. 24
(1987),

P.2d

{

-

*

|

, (filed May 28, 1987)(attached as Addendum A ) ,

this Court has misconstrued and misapprehended the facts and law.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

j

The initial encounter between police and Appellants was a
seizure requiring a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was
afoot in order to be justified.

Neither the United States Supreme

4

Court nor this Court has established prior to this opinion that
police may initiate contact with an individual on a public street
absent a showing that they had such a reasonable suspicion.

In

4

addition, the facts in the present case establish that even if such
a police-citizen encounter were permissible, absent a reasonable
suspicion, the officer actually stopped or seized Appellants where
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4

he followed Appellants and attempted to effectuate a stop, then
called to Appellants and asked to talk with them, Appellants
responded by crossing the street to where the officer stood, the
officer asked for identification and then detained Appellants while
running a warrants check and asked several investigatory questions.
As contended in Appellant's opening brief, the officer lacked a
reasonable suspicion to justify such seizure, and the fruits thereof
should be suppressed,
ARGUMENT
THE INITIAL ENCOUNTER BETWEEN APPELLANTS AND POLICE
WAS A SEIZURE REQUIRING A REASONABLE SUSPICION THAT
CRIMINAL ACTIVITY WAS AFOOT TO BE JUSTIFIED.
This Court relied on United States v. Merritt, 736 F.2d 223
(5th Cir. 1984), for the proposition, and ultimately the support for
its holding, that the facts of the case demonstrated a
constitutionally permissible police-citizen encounter.
A.

See Addendum

The decision reads:

In United States v. Merritt...the Fifth Circuit
Court delineated three levels of police
encounters with the public which the United
States Supreme Court has held are
constitutionally permissible:
(l)an officer may approach a citizen at
anytime [sic] and pose questions so long as
the citizen is not detained against his will;
(2) an officer may seize a person if the
officer has an "articulable suspicion" that
the person has committed or is about to
commit a crime; however, the "detention must
be temporary and last no longer than is
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the
stop"; (3)an officer may arrest a suspect if
the officer has probable cause to believe an
offense has been committed or is being
committed.
United States v. Merritt, supra, at 230 (citations omitted).

This

Court then states, "In this case, the initial encounter by the
police with defendants falls into the first category."
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

However, in citing Merritt and relying on the above
quotation, this Court misapprehends the law.

In I.N.S. v. Delgado,

466 U.S. 210, 216 (1984), the United States Supreme Court expressly
stated that that Court has "yet to rule directly on whether mere
questioning of an individual by a police officer, without more, can
amount to a seizure under the Fourth Amendment..."

The Supreme

Court then added that the recent decision in Florida v. Royer, 460
U.S. 491 (1983), implied that requests by police for one's
identification would unlikely result in a Fourth Amendment
violation.

I.N.S. v. Delgado, supra, at 216.

However, Florida v.

Royer, supra, actually held that officers had illegally detained the
defendant at the time of his consent to a search of his luggage
thereby tainting the search and rendering ineffective the consent.
Florida v. Royer, supra at 507-08.
Moreover, Florida v. Royer is a case which fits into a very
narrow factual context and is distinguishable on that basis.
Florida v. Royer, supra; United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544
(1980); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983); Reid v.
Georgia, 448 U.S. 438 (1980); and Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1
(1984); are all cases which draw support for the police-citizen
encounter concept in the context of detaining "drug couriers" at
airports.

These cases are distinguishable from the present case

because of the transitory nature of airports, the government's
compelling interest in stopping the transportation of drugs, and the
use of drug courier profiles in making a decision to approach an
individual.

The United States Supreme Court has therefore given

special consideration and allowances in balancing these special
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concerns and interests with those of the Fourth Amendment,

See

generally United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 561 (Powell, J.,
concurring opinion); and Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. at 508 (Powell,
J., concurring opinion)(facts and circumstances of investigative
stops necessarily vary, and the public has compelling interest in
identifying by all lawful means those who traffic in illicit drugs).
The rationale for the Royer and Mendenhall line of cases
was borrowed from cases involving the violation of immigration
laws.

This is another area where the exigencies of the

circumstances and a compelling governmental interest warrant a
limiting of Fourth Amendment protections.
In United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975),
the United States Supreme Court clarified that reasonable suspicion
of criminal activity could warrant a temporary seizure for the
purpose of questioning, limited, however, to verifying or dispelling
the suspicion that the immigration laws were being violated.

The

Court recognized such violation as "a governmental interest that was
sufficient to warrant temporary detention for limited questioning.ff
Royer, supra, at 498-99 (citing Brignoni-Ponce, supra at 881-82).
Notably, immigration violations, like drug courier cases, fit within
the realm of profiles, target cities, and other exigencies demanding
a stretch of the balancing of the interests of society and the
individual's Fourth Amendment rights.1

^One additional exception where a temporary detention is
satisfied as reasonably based on the exigencies involved is that of
detaining the occupant of a house while executing a search warrant.
See Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (L981).
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Unlike those special, more demanding types of cases, the
case at bar contains no special exigencies to demand the same
narrowing of the individual's rights against unreasonable search and
seizures.

Inasmuch as the United States Supreme Court has never

directly ruled on the constitutionality of police-citizen encounters
as explained in Delgado, and has not implicitly approved such a
concept in the context of this case—where police approach a citizen
on a public street, the Fifth Circuit's opinion in Merritt is in
error to imply that they have,
i

A review of the facts in Merritt discloses that the cited
language there is dictum.

In Merritt, the government did not argue

that a police-citizen encounter, rather than a seizure, occurred.
The government consistently and successfully argued that the
investigatory stop was supported by an articuable suspicion that the
vessel was engaged in drug trafficking.

The Fifth Circuit actually
i

affirmed that the stop was valid under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
(1968) standards.

United States v. Merritt, supra, at 230. The

cited language was surplusage in Merritt and should not be relied on
by this Court in establishing new law in this jurisdiction.
This Court has yet to approve and legitimize the
police-citizen encounter theory.

Statutorily, there appears to be
i

no room for such a theory.

Utah Code Ann. §77-7-15 (1953 as

amended) provides:
§77-7-15. Authority of peace officer to stop and
question suspect—Grounds. A peace officer may
stop any person in a public place when he has a
reasonable suspicion to believe he has committed
or is in the act of committing or is attempting
to commit a public offense and may demand his
name, address and an explanation of his actions.
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This statutory codification of Terry v. Ohio, supra, requires an
officer to have a reasonable suspicion to stop an individual and ask
his name, address and an explanation of his actions.
Additionally, case law from this Court has yet to establish
that police may approach an individual or otherwise initiate an
interaction with an individual absent a reasonable articulable
suspicion that the individual is involved in criminal activity.

In

State v. Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103 (Utah 1980), cited in the
opinion, an officer approached defendants in an all-night laundromat
at 1:00 a.m.

The officer asked the individuals for identification

and an explanation of their presence.

This Court held that "there

was no improper seizure or detention in the questioning."
105 (emphasis added).

ld_. at

There was "no improper seizure" because the

officer articulated reasonable, objective facts upon which he based
the stop.

Those facts were:

(1) the officer knew there had been

several thefts committed in the area; (2) he observed that the
defendants were alone in the laundromat; and (3) from previous
encounters with them, he knew they were from out-of-town and that,
on the prior occasion, they had been in possession of contraband and
a bag full of coins.

Ij3. This Court, therefore, considered the

stop a seizure and not a police-citizen encounter.
In State v. Christensen, 676 P.2d 408, 412 (Utah 1984),
this Court found that no seizure, detention or investigatory stop
occurred and pointed out that "[a]ny person may, of course, direct a
question to another in passing" (citations omitted),

in

Christensen, police officers were investigating an abandoned truck
and attached trailer which was obstructing traffic.
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The defendant

returned to the scene, got out of the vehicle in which he was
riding, and approached the officers.
officers, initiated contact.

The appellant, not the

In determining whether a seizure

occurred, there is a marked distinction between an individual
approaching the officers, and the officers initiating the encounter
by following an individual, then asking the individual to answer
some questions.
In the present case, officers followed Appellants and
initiated the contact with Appellants.

Although Appellants walked

across the street to the officerfs car, they did so in response to a
request by the officer.
officers initially

<

In its brief, the state concedes that the

approached Appellants and posed questions as

part of their investigation of the alarm (Respondent's Brief at 8 ) .
Although the initial stop of Appellants in this case did not amount
to an arrest requiring probable cause, it nevertheless was a
temporary detention for investigatory purposes and pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §77-7-15 (1953 as amended), the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of the Utah
Constitution, the officers needed a reasonable articulable suspicion
that Appellants had committed a crime to justify the stop and
subsequent request for identification.
In State v. Swanigan, 699 P.2d 718 (Utah 1985), an officer
stopped two men walking near the scene of a burglary.
told the men to stop and asked for identification.

The officer

A backup officer

arrived and the officers phoned in a warrants check.

This Court

considered this action a "seizure" and held that the officers did

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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{

not have a reasonable suspicion based on objective facts to justify
the stop.2
Even if this Court accepts the concept that police may
initiate contact with individuals on a public street absent a
reasonable suspicion that they are involved in criminal activity,
the facts in this case indicate nevertheless that the initial
encounter between the officer and the appellants was a seizure. The
initial stop in this case is similar to the actual stop in
Swanigan.

The only difference is one of semantics-in Swanigan the

officer approached the individuals and asked them for
identification, then ran a warrants check.

In the present case, the

officer asked to talk to the appellants; they responded to his
request by crossing the street to where he was standing.

The

officer then asked for identification and ran a warrants check on
the pair.

The officer's decision to arrest Swanigan based on an

outstanding warrant as opposed to the officer's decision not to
arrest based on the warrant he found in this case, does not change
the nature of the initial

detention.

In the present case, the officer spotted Deitman and Lozano
near the place where the alarm sounded.

He followed their vehicle

for approximately two blocks, then attempted to effectuate a stop
(T. 40-41).

At the time the officer attempted to stop the pair,

they were pulling into a driveway, so the officer pulled across the
street and waited (T. 41). When the pair got out of their vehicle,
the officer called to them and asked to talk with them.

2

They

Noteworthy in Swanigan is that the State confessed error
and admitted that the evidence was seized pursuant to an unlawful
detention. Swanigan, 699 P.2d at 719.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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responded to his request by walking to where he was standing (T.
42).

The pair gave the officer the identification he requested; the

officer then ran a warrants check on them which lasted two to three
minutes (T. 42). The officer then asked the pair what they had been
doing in the area of the video store where the alarm went off (T.
42-43).
Even if this court chooses to draw a distinction in
deciding whether a seizure occurred based on whether the officer
approached individuals and asked for identification or called to
them and had them approach him in response to his request, detaining
individuals to run a warrants check after the initial questioning
nevertheless amounts to a seizure.

For this Court to hold in this

case that a detention to run a warrants check on an individual is
not a seizure under the Fourth Amendment or Article I, Section 14 of
the Utah Constitution, and is permissible police activity which does
not require a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal
activity, opens the door for significant abuse by police officers.
Pursuant to the opinion in this case, officers arguably could
initiate an encounter with individuals on no grounds whatsoever,
couch their initial statements to those individuals in terms.of a
request rather than demand, request that the individual walk to them
rather than walking over to the individual, then run a warrants
check on such individuals and proceed with investigatory questioning
where the individuals have done nothing irregular.

Surely, where an

officer attempts to effectuate a stop, acknowledges that he followed
and requested to talk to individuals as part of an investigation,
asks those individuals to identify themselves and runs a warrants
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check on such individuals, then asks investigatory questions/ a
"seizure" has occurred and the protections of the Fourth Amendment
to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of the
Utah Constitution come into play.
If this Court distinguishes this case from Swanigan and
decides against Messrs.

Deitman and Lozano, it should resist any

temptation to do so on the police-citizen encounter theory.

Not

only is Merritt bad precedent for establishing the concept that
officers may initiate encounters with citizens on less than a
reasonable suspicion, but in this case the initial interaction
amounted to a seizure.

In its brief, while the State does make a

one sentence statement that the initial encounter in this case was
not a seizure, the State primarily argues that the officers had a
reasonable suspicion to stop the Appellants (Brief of Respondent,
pp. 7-8).
In this petition for rehearing, Messrs. Deitman and Lozano
request that this Court reconsider the police-citizen encounter
concept in general and as applied to the facts of this case and
refrain from a further narrowing of the individual rights protected
under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution.
CONCLUSION
Because this Court has misconstrued and misapplied the
facts and law in this case, the Appellants respectfully petition
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this Court to reconsider its decision in this case and reverse and
remand the convictions for either a new trial or dismissal of the
charges*
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this of*/-

day /of June, 1987.

hix^-oJii&JtJ?
BROOKE C. WELLS
Attorney for Appellants
CERTIFICATION
I, BROOKE C. WELLS, do hereby certify the following:
(1)

I am the attorney for appellants/petitioners in this

case and;
(2) This Petition for Rehearing is presented to this Court
in good faith and not to delay any matter in this case.
Respectfully submitted this ^ V ^ day /of June, 1987.

!

^fu

^hi^

&- 6ui

BROOKE C. WELLS
Attorney for Appellants
DELIVERED/MAILED a copy of the foregoing Petition for
Rehearing to the Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol
Building, Salt Lake City, Utah

84114 this

day of June, 1987.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.
Gerald W. Deitman and
Albert D. Lczano,
Defendants and Appellants.

No.

20584

F I L E D
May 2 8 , 1987

Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk

Third District Court, Salt Lake County
The Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson
Attorneys:

David C. Biggs, Brooke C. Wells, Salt Lake City,
for Appellants
• Dave Thompson, Earl F. Dorius, Salt Lake City,
for Respondents

PER CURIAM:
Defendants appeal from convictions of burglary1 and
theft.
They raise as their single issue that the evidence
should have been suppressed on the ground that police officers
had insufficient probable cause to effectuate a stop. We
affirm.
2

In the early morning hours of March 1, 1984, a
burglar alarm sounded at International Video in Salt Lake
City. Officers arriving at the scene observed a white pickup
truck, with a camper attached, pull away from the curb across
the street from the shop. One of the officers followed this
truck until it stopped in front of a residence a few blocks
away. The officer waited until the occupants, defendants,
exited the vehicle. The officer called to defendants and
asked if he could speak to them. They responded by crossing
the street to his vehicle and presented identification upon
request. The officer then asked his dispatcher to check for
outstanding warrants against defendants, which revealed an
outstanding warrant against Mr. Lozano. However, neither
defendant was arrested at this time.
IT. A third degree felony under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202
(1953).
2. A second degree
felony
under
Utah
Code
76-6-412
Digitized by the
Howard W. Hunter
Law Library,
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Law School,§BYU.
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(1953).

The officer then returned to the video shop, where
other officers had found a broken window and had called the
owner of the shop. The owner reported that a two-piece video
cassette recorder was missing*
Officers returned to the residence where the white
truck was still parked and knocked on the door. Defendants
agreed to talk to the officers. Defendant Deitman gave the
officers permission to look into the truck but not to enter
it. One officer flashed his light into the rear window of
the camper and observed "a black rectangular object with what
appeared to be a memory switch." Defendants were arrested and
the truck was impounded. A search warrant was obtained. The
truck was searched, and a VCR and a tuner were discovered in
the truck. The VCR had the serial No. 2025H0058. The serial
number reported by the owner to be on the missing VCR was
No. 202510058. This number was therefore listed on the
search warrant.
Defendants contend that the officers had no probable
cause for the initial stop and that the trial court erred in
denying their pretrial motion, renewed at trial, to suppress
the evidence.
In United States v. Merritt, 736 F.2d 223 (5th Cir.
1984), the Fifth Circuit Court delineated three levels of
police encounters with the public which the United States
Supreme Court has held are constitutionally permissible:
(1) an officer may approach a citizen at
anytime [sic] and pose questions so long as
the citizen is not detained against his will;
(2) an officer may seize a person if the
officer has an "articulable suspicion" that
the person has committed or is about to
commit a crime? however, the "detention must
be temporary and last no longer than is
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the
stop"; (3) an officer may arrest a suspect
if the officer has probable cause to believe
an offense has been committed or is being
committed.
736 F.2d at 230 (citation omitted) . .
In this case, the initial encounter by the police with
defendants falls into the first category. The officer was
justified in asking defendants for identification and an
explanation of their presence in an area where police had
responded to a burglar alarm. Defendants were not detained
against their will and were not arrested at this time. In
State v. Wittenback, 621 P.2d 103 (Utah 1980), this Court said:

No-. 20584

•

2
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Though there may be no probable cause to
make an arrest, a police officer may, in
appropriate circumstances and in an
appropriate manner, approach a person for
investigating possible criminal behavior.
621 P.2d at 105.
Defendants rely on State v. Swanigan, 699 P.2d 718
(Utah 1985), and State v. Carpena, 714 P.2d 674 (Utah 1986),
but neither case is applicable here. In both Carpena and
Swanigan, the defendants were stopped, detained, and searched
without their consent. Here, defendants were not stopped by
the officer and raised no objection when the officer asked if
he could talk to them. They crossed the street, produced
identification on request, and were not detained against
their will. We hold that the court did not err in refusing
to suppress the evidence under these circumstances.
Defendants also argue that the search warrant was
defective because the serial number of the VCR contained an
incorrect number in place of a letter. However, since defendants admit that this error in the warrant did not render the
property#seized "inherently unidentifiable as being stolen,"
State v. Gallegos, 712 P.2d 207 (Utah 1985), we do not discuss
the issue.
Affirmed.

Howe, Justice, concurs in the result.

3
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